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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tristum Beeks appeals from his conviction for felony Violation of a No 
Contact Order (Third Offense). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Beeks with violating Idaho Code § 18-918, Domestic 
Assault or Domestic Battery and the court entered a no contact order on 
February 11, 2013. (State's Ex. 2.) The no contact order prohibited Beeks from 
having any contact or communication with Amanda Murillo. (Id.) The no contact 
order had a typo, and expired on the same day it was issued. (Id.) The next day 
the district court corrected the typo and issued an amended no contact order and 
extended the expiration date to February 11, 2014. (State's Ex. 4.) On June 13, 
2013 the district court entered another order, extending the no contact order to 
June 13, 2015. (State's Ex. 3.) 
On September 8, 2013 Beeks was in custody at the Canyon County jail 
and he set up a visit under his Telmate visitation phone system. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 
12, Ls. 9-23, p. 17, Ls. 11-17.) The visitation was recorded. (State's Ex. 1.) The 
video starts by showing Ms. Murillo speaking with another inmate. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 
19, L. 19 - p. 20, L. 21; State's Ex. 1.) The inmate says to Ms. Murillo, "he wants 
to know if it's okay to talk." (Id.) The inmate talks to someone off screen, then 
Beeks enters the screen and the inmate hands him the phone. (Id.) 
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Beeks and Ms. Murillo then talk for over 27 minutes. (Id.) During the 
conversation, Beeks acknowledges the no contact order. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 
2-12.) Beeks asks Ms. Murillo "did you go to the court did you get the NCO 
dropped?" (State's Ex. 1.) Ms. Murillo answers in the negative. (Id.) After Ms. 
Murillo confirms that the no contact order had not been dropped, Beeks 
continues to speak with her for another 12 minutes. (Id.) 
The state charged Beeks with Violation of a No Contact Order (Third 
Offense), felony. (R. pp. 23-24.) At trial, the state introduced a copy of the 
recorded video conversation between Beeks and Ms. Murillo. (State's Ex. 1.) 
The video had been redacted. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 18-24, p. 36, Ls. 19-23.) 
Deputy Hofktins testified that he served a no contact order on Beeks. (1/7/14 
Tr., p. 27, Ls. 2-15.) Copies of the February 11, 2013 No Contact Order, the 
Amended February 12, 2013 No Contact Order and the June 13, 2013 extension 
were admitted into evidence. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 18 - p. 29, L. 9; State's Exs. 
2, 3 and 4.) 
After the conclusion of the state's case, Beeks moved for a judgment of 
acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 43, L. 21 - p. 45, L. 12.) 
Beeks argued the state failed to prove that Beeks "has been charged with 
domestic assault and battery" and failed to show that Beeks "had notice of the 
order." (1/7/14 Tr., p. 44, L. 9 - p. 45, L. 12.) The district court found that the 
state presented sufficient evidence and denied Beeks' Motion. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 49, 
L. 25 - p. 50, L. 15.) 
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Beeks also requested the district court give Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 
No. 1508, regarding accident or mistake. (1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 73, L. 24 - p. 82, 
L. 5; R. pp. 26A-B.) 
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those who 
committed the act or made the omission charged through 
misfortune or by accident when it appears that there was not evil 
design, intention or culpable negligence. 
(R., p. 26B.) The district court determined that it was obvious from the recording 
that Beeks recognized Ms. Murillo and continued to communicate with her. 
(1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 78, Ls. 7-21.) The district court ruled that based upon the 
evidence introduced at trial it would not give this instruction. (1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 
80, L. 15 - p. 82, L. 5.) 
During closing argument Beeks argued that the state failed to present 
significant evidence that Beeks was charged with domestic assault or domestic 
battery. (1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 98, Ls. 3-11.) In rebuttal, the state pointed out that 
it was limited in how much information it could present regarding Beeks' 
underlying domestic violence charge. (1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 103, L. 19 - p. 104, 
L. 3.) A jury found Beeks Guilty of Violating a No Contact Order. (R., pp. 36-37.) 
In part two, the jury also found Beeks Guilty of at least two Violations of a No 
Contact Order with the last five years. (R., p. 43.) 
Beeks filed a Motion for Judgment of Aquital [sic] and a Motion for Mistrial. 
(R., pp. 41-56.) The district court denied Beeks' motions. (R., pp. 58-60.) The 
district court ruled that Beeks' claims did not warrant a new trial. (3/14/14 Tr., p. 
5, L. 16 - p. 6, L. 1.) The district court also determined that Beeks did not object 
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to the prosecutor's statements and held the statements did not rise to the level of 
fundamental error. (3/14/14 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 7-16.) 
The district court sentenced Beeks to three years with 18 months fixed. 
(R., pp. 64-66.) The district court retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 64-66.) Beeks 
timely appealed. (R., pp. 67-69.) Beeks objected to the record on appeal. (R., 
pp. 77 A-77D.) The district court sustained Beeks' objection and ordered 
additional items be prepared for the appellate record. (R., pp. 77E-77G.) 
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ISSUES 
Beeks states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in failing to instruct the jury on the 
necessary intent element of the crime and in refusing to instruct the 
jury that acts or omissions committed through misfortune or 
accident, and with no evil design, intention or culpable negligence, 
are not criminal? 
2. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of 
fundamental error when it elicited testimony regarding the 
existence of two no contact orders, and when it repeatedly told the 
jury that there was additional information that the prosecutor was 
not allowed to tell the jury, including that Mr. Beeks had previously 
been charged with either domestic assault or domestic battery? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Beeks failed to show that the district court committed 
fundamental error by not giving a "union of act and intent" instruction and has 
Beeks failed to show the district court erred by declining to give to a "misfortune 
or accident" jury instruction? 
2. Has Beeks failed to show that the prosecutor committed 
prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error when the 
prosecutor referenced multiple no contact orders and instructed the jury to only 
decide the case based on the evidence presented? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Beeks Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental Error When It 
Instructed The Jury On The Elements Of A No Contact Order Violation And 
Beeks Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Declined To Give A 
"Accident or Misfortune" Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Beeks claims the district court committed fundamental error by not 
instructing the jury regarding the "union of act and intent." (Appellant's brief, p. 
6.) Beeks failed to show the district court committed error. Beeks further failed 
to show that this alleged error affected the outcome of the trial because Beeks 
was caught on video communicating with Ms. Murillo in violation of a no contact 
order. (State's Ex. 1.) 
Beeks also claims the district court erred when it declined to give his 
requested instruction regarding "misfortune or accident." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The district court did not err because no reasonable view of the evidence 
introduced at trial supported the proposed instruction. Beeks spoke with Ms. 
Murillo for approximately 27 minutes. (State's Ex. 1.) There was no "accidental" 
violation of the no contact order. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 
414, 430 (2009). "An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error 
when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the 
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instruction." kl (citation omitted). "If the instructions, considered as a whole, 
fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law, then no 
error has been committed." kl (quotations, citation and brackets omitted). 
C. It Was Not Fundamental Error For The District Court Not To Give A Union 
Of Act And Intent Instruction 
Beeks argues that the district court erred because it failed to instruct the 
jury regarding the union of act and intent. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Beeks claims 
that union of act and intent is a required element of a no contact order violation 
under Idaho Code § 18-920. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-10.) Beeks concedes that 
he did not object to the elements jury instruction. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
Because this issue was not preserved, it may only be reviewed for 
fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 
(2010). The burden of demonstrating fundamental error, however, rests squarely 
with the defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal. kl at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980. To carry that burden, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. 
Beeks argues that the failure to give the "union of act and intent" 
instruction violates his "unwaived constitutional rights" because the "union of act 
and intent" is an element of the crime. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-9.) Beeks' 
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analysis is incorrect. Violation of a No Contact Order is governed by Idaho Code 
§ 18-920. The district court instructed the jury regarding the elements of a 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-920: 
Violating a No Contact Order, the state must prove each of the 
following: 
1. On or about September 8, 2013 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant, Tristum Beeks II 
4. had been charged with Domestic Assault or Domestic 
Battery 
5. a no contact order had been issued by a court or by an 
Idaho criminal rule forbidding the defendant from having 
contact with Amanda Murillo, and 
6. the defendant had contact with Amanda Murillo in violation 
of the order, and 
7. before such contact the defendant had notice of the order. 
(R., p. 35Q.) This instruction mirrors the elements laid out in Idaho Code § 18-
920. Under the statute, there were no additional elements required, and Beeks' 
attempt to graft an additional element on to a violation of Idaho Code § 18-920 
fails. The authorities cited by Beeks do not require a district court always give a 
"union of act and intent" instruction when instructing on the elements of Idaho 
Code § 18-920. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-10 (citing I.C. § 18-114; State v. Fox, 
124 Idaho 924,926,866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993); State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 
129 P.3d 1258 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Baldwin, 69 Idaho 459, 464, 208 P.2d 
161, 164 (1949).) Idaho Code § 18-114 states, "In every crime or public offense 
there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal 
negligence." There is nothing in the statute that requires a district court give a 
jury instruction repeating the language of the statute. Nor do the cases cited by 
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Beeks support his conclusion. State v. Fox analyzed whether a defendant must 
have knowledge that ephedrine was illegal to be convicted of Idaho Code § 37-
2732(c). 124 Idaho at 925-926, 866 P.2d at 182-183. Fox held that where the 
criminal statute does not set forth any mental state as an element of the statute, 
"the intention with which the act is done, or the lack of criminal intent in the 
premises, is immaterial." & (citation omitted.) 
The text of the possession statute does not set forth any mental 
state as an element of the offense. This Court has previously ruled 
that "whether a criminal intent is a necessary element of a statutory 
offense is a matter of construction, to be determined from the 
language of the statute in view of its manifest purpose and design, 
and where such intent is not made an ingredient of the offense, the 
intention with which the act is done, or the lack of any criminal 
intent in the premises, is immaterial." 
Id. (citing State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580, 583, 207 P. 1071, 1072 (1922).) 
Sterrett held, "Error cannot be predicated upon the action of the court in 
excluding evidence tending to show the defendant's good intentions and good 
faith, where a criminal intent is not a necessary element of the offense charged." 
Sterrett, 35 Idaho at 583, 207 P. at 1072. Nor does Macias or Baldwin require 
the district court instruct the jury on Idaho Code § 18-114 when the defendant is 
charged with Violation of a No Contact Order. In Macias, the court discussed the 
"willfully" state of mind required to convict a defendant of battery and held that 
misfortune or accident instruction was not necessary. Macias, 142 Idaho at 510-
511, 129 P.3d at 1259-160. In Baldwin, the court did advise that the "union of 
act and intent" instruction should generally be given, but eventually held it was 
not necessary to give the "union of act of intent" instruction because the 
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elements of fraud were properly included in the jury instructions. Baldwin, 69 
Idaho at 464-465, 208 P.2d at 164-165. The district court properly instructed the 
jury on the elements of a No Contact Order Violation and none of the cases cited 
by Beeks required the district court instruct the jury on Idaho Code§ 18-114. 
A district court is only required to give a jury instruction if a reasonable 
view of the evidence supports an instruction. See~ State v. Young, 157 Idaho 
280, _, 335 P. 3d 620, 625-626 (Ct. App. 2014). The evidence at trial showed a 
recorded video conversation between Beeks and Ms. Murillo lasting 27 minutes. 
There is no reasonable view of the evidence that would require a "union of act 
and intent" instruction. 
Beeks argues the second Perry prong is met because "the law is clear 
that conviction for a criminal offense requires the jury to find a requisite state of 
mind." (Appellant's brief, p. 10 (citing State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 129 P.3d 
1258 (Ct. App. 2005).) Beeks is incorrect. As cited above, the law does not 
clearly require a district court to add an element based upon Idaho Code § 18-
114 to a charge arising under Idaho Code § 18-920. Based upon the evidence 
introduced at trial, the district court properly instructed the jury on the elements of 
a no contact order violation under Idaho Code § 18-920. (See R., p. 350.) If 
there was error, it was not clear error and Beeks failed to show the second prong 
of the fundamental error analysis. 
Beeks claims the failure to give the "union of act and intent" instruction 
was not harmless and affected the outcome of the proceedings because "there 
was a question of whether Mr. Beeks initiated the video visit or if he merely 
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participated in the video visit." (See Appellant's brief, pp. 7-10.) Beeks analysis 
ignores the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-920. Under Idaho Code § 18-920 
it does not matter whether Beeks initiated the contact. The statute does not 
require a defendant to initiate the contact. The only relevant fact is that he 
continued the contact. 
If there was error, it was harmless. There is a video recording of the 
contact between Beeks and Ms. Murillo. (State's Ex. 1.) On the video Beeks 
acknowledged the no contact order but still continued continue to communicate 
with Ms. Murillo in violation of that order. (Id.) He talked to Ms. Murillo for over 
27 minutes. (Id.) Beeks failed to show that any error in the jury instructions 
could have affected the outcome of the trial. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err When It Refused To Instruct The Jury On 
Culpability For Acts Or Omissions Committed Through Misfortune Or 
Accident 
Beeks argues that the district court erred when it refused to instruct the 
jury on the culpability for acts or omissions committed through misfortune or 
accident. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-13.) Beeks requested the district court give 
ICJI 1508: 
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those who 
committed the act or made the omission charged through 
misfortune or by accident when it appears that there was not evil 
design, intention or culpable negligence. 
(R., pp. 26A-26B.) The district court ruled that it would not give this instruction 
regarding misfortune or accident. (1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 80, L. 15- p. 82, L. 5.) 
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To determine whether the trial court should have given a requested jury 
instruction, the appellate court examines the instructions that were given and the 
evidence adduced at trial. State v. Ortega, 157 Idaho 782, _, 339 P.3d 1186, 
1193 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Hoover, 138 Idaho 414, 421, 64 P.3d 340, 
347 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476, 886 P.2d 780, 781 
(Ct. App. 1994).) The appellate courts apply a four-part test to determine 
whether a requested jury instruction should have been given: "a requested 
instruction must be given where: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a 
reasonable view of the evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it 
is not addressed adequately by other jury instructions; and (4) it does not 
constitute an impermissible comment as to the evidence." !sL. (citing Hoover, 138 
Idaho at 421, 64 P.3d at 347; Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77, 886 P.2d at 781-
82; State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383, 385, 807 P.2d 62, 64 (Ct. App. 1991).) 
The district court was correct to deny Beeks request. While ICJI 1508 
properly states governing law, it fails the other three parts of the four part test. It 
is undisputed that Beeks and Ms. Murillo spoke for over 27 minutes (see State's 
Ex. 1.) It is not a reasonable view of the evidence that Beeks "accidentally" 
communicated with Ms. Murillo. The elements of a no contact order violation 
were adequately covered by another jury instruction (R., p. 35Q.) Finally, if the 
district court gave the "accident or misfortune" instruction the district court would 
be impermissibly commenting on the evidence because it would give the jury the 
impression that, contrary to the evidence on the video, there was some 
"accident" that caused the contact or that Ms. Murillo's participation in the visit 
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somehow eliminated Beeks' culpability. The district court did not err when it 
refused to give the "accident or misfortune" instruction. 
Even if Beeks' argument is accepted, his claim still fails. Beeks argues he 
was entitled to this jury instruction because Ms. Murillo voluntarily came to the jail 
and wanted to speak to him. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.) However, even 
Beeks concedes that fifteen minutes into the conversation Ms. Murillo told Beeks 
that the no contact order was not dropped. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) The video 
evidence shows that Beeks continued to communicate for another 12 minutes. 
(State's Ex. 1.) It is not a reasonable view of the facts to conclude that Beeks 
"accidently" spoke to Ms. Murillo for 12 minutes. Therefore, even under Beeks' 
view of the facts, the district court was correct not to give the "accident or 
misfortune" instruction. 
Even if the district court erred by refusing the "accident or misfortune" 
instruction, the error was harmless. As noted above, the communication was 
recorded on video, and during the recording Beeks acknowledges the existence 
of the no contact order. (See State's Ex. 1.) If there was error, it was harmless. 
11. 
Beeks Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct And Failed To 
Show Fundamental Error 
A Introduction 
Beeks argues that during voir dire and rebuttal argument the prosecutor 
referenced evidence that was not introduced at trial and these references rise to 
the level of fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-20 (citing 1/7/14 Supp 
Tr., p. 39, L. 17 - p. 40, L. 8, p. 40, L. 17 - p. 41, L. 20, p. 103, L. 16-p. 104, L. 
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3).) Contrary to Beeks argument, the prosecutor did not improperly reference 
non-admitted evidence during closing but was instead responding to Beeks' 
argument. Nor did the prosecutor err during voir dire when he asked a juror if 
they could decide the case on the evidence provided and not speculate as to 
additional evidence which would not be introduced. 
Beeks also argues that the prosecutor committed fundamental error by 
referencing "multiple" no contact orders. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-24 (citing 
1/7/14 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 12-21; 1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 93, Ls. 3-16, p. 104,L. 17 - p. 
105, L. 12).) Evidence of two no contact orders was admitted without objection 
and the prosecutor's reference to admitted evidence at closing was not error. 
Nor was it clear error, because based upon the evidence at trial, it was 
reasonable for the jury to believe that the prosecutor was not referencing a 
second no contact order but was instead referencing the multiple times the same 
no contact order had been issued. (See State's Exs. 2, 3, and 4.) 
Finally, Beeks fails to show any comment by the prosecutor affected the 
outcome of the trial because Beeks was caught violating the no contact order on 
video. (See State's Ex. 1.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[TJhe standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
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the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 
error. Perry at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Err When He Responded To Beeks' Closing 
Argument And Did Not Err By Questioning A Prospective Juror Regarding 
Their Ability To Decide The Case Based Upon The Evidence Introduced 
At Trial 
Beeks argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in both voir dire 
and in rebuttal argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-20 (citing 1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 
39, L. 17 - p. 41, L. 20, p. 103, L. 16 - p.104, L.3).) Beeks argues that the 
prosecutor insinuated that there was additional evidence that he was not allowed 
to present to the jury. (Id.) Beeks did not object to this alleged misconduct. 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Perry, unobjected to claims 
of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test. The first prong of the 
fundamental error test requires Beeks to demonstrate a constitutional violation. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Beeks cannot satisfy the first prong 
because the prosecutor's comments during voir dire and rebuttal were not 
improper. ''The general rule is that 'both parties are given wide latitude in making 
their arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be 
made therefrom."' State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 368-369, 313 P.3d 1, 24-25 
(2013) (citing State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414,440 (2009); 
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504, 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1980)). "It is also 
well-established that 'great latitude' is allowed during voir dire questioning." !st 
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(citing State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 81, 878 P.2d 776, 780 (1994); State v. Bitz. 
93 Idaho 239,243,460 P.2d 374, 378 (1969).) 
During jury selection, the prosecutor, Mr. Boyd, had the following 
exchange with a prospective juror regarding their ability to render a verdict only 
on the evidence presented at trial: 
MR. BOYD: Did that sour your taste for the whole system? 
Do you think you can be a fair and impartial juror? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don't think it has any bearing on 
my ability to judge the case as presented and to evaluate the 
information given. 
MR. BOYD: Thanks. That brings me to a good point here. 
You're going to hear a lot of things in the trial, and the stuff that's 
presented to you, you know, what evidence is versus what the -
you know, what the lawyers. Can you tell the difference between 
what I'm telling you versus what the evidence is or what the 
defense attorney is telling you versus what the evidence is? 
There's a difference there. 
And you're not going to be able to get everything maybe you 
want. I mean, it's funny how the criminal justice system works, but 
you only get the evidence that is relevant, that matters. So you 
have a certain law, and then you have to see whether it fits and 
whether it broke the law or not. And that's kind of it. 
So I don't get to go into like all the reasons. I don't get to 
like, you know - this isn't judgment day, you know, at the end of 
your life. I'm not trying to, you know, say you're a good or bad 
person. But you only get to put so much evidence on. And there 
might be something else that you want to know, something else 
that you think well, I'd like to know this before I hit this guy with this, 
you know, with a conviction or a not guilty. 
And what do you do with that? Do you think that enters into 
what you have to do today? Number - I'm going to try to grab up 
people who haven't spoken yet. Number 198? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Try it again. 
MR. BOYD: Okay. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I didn't get it the first time. 
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MR. BOYD: That's all right. So you may not be given all of 
the information that you might think you want. Okay. But if you're 
given all of the information that's relevant, can you go ahead and 
make a verdict on this case or do you need more information if you 
just feel like: I want more? What do you do with that, with that 
feeling of: Oh, I wish I knew the whole story behind something? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: You can only base your judgment 
on the information that you're given. You can't go with a what if. 
MR. BOYD: Thank you. Right. So there's going to some 
information here in this case, for example, that I am not going to 
get to talk about, I'm not going to get to like go on and on about, I 
might like to or not -
THE COURT: Counsel. 
MR. BOYD: Judge, I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: I don't want you to give the implication that 
there's other information out there in this case. That's improper to 
do that. 
MR. BOYD: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: The jury will be given all the information that 
is relevant to this case, and it's improper to leave it open for them 
to speculate about the potential of other information out there. So 
don't go into that anymore. That's just speculation and -
MR. BOYD: Okay, I'm sorry. What I was trying to say is that 
you'll be given just the information that is relevant to this case. And 
are you okay with that? Thank you. 
(1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 39, L. 2 - p. 41, L. 24.) The prosecutor's comments during 
voir dire were not improper because he was questioning the jury regarding their 
ability to decide the case only on the evidence presented and not speculate as to 
the rest of the story. It was important for the prosecutor to question on this topic 
for two reasons. First, to prove the crime of violation of a no contact order, the 
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state was required to prove, among other things that Beeks "had been charged 
with Domestic Assault or Domestic Battery." (R., p. 350.) Thus, during trial the 
prosecutor would be presenting evidence of a prior Domestic Assault or Battery 
Charge, but would not be presenting the "whole story" of that charge because it 
would be potentially inadmissible "prior bad act" evidence. Second, in order to 
avoid other potentially unfairly prejudicial evidence, the state and the defense 
redacted State's Exhibit 1, the video recording. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 18-24, p. 
36, Ls. 19-23.) The video was very clearly redacted and the state needed the 
jury to decide the case based upon what was on the video and not speculate as 
to what was redacted. As a result, the prosecutor properly questioned the 
prospective juror on their ability to only decide the case on the facts presented 
and not speculate as to other facts. 
The second comment to which Beeks takes exception occurred during the 
prosecutor's rebuttal. (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) Beeks argues that the 
prosecutor impermissibly insinuated there was more evidence regarding Beeks 
underlying domestic violence charge. (Id.) However, during closing argument 
Beeks argued that the state failed to present significant evidence that Beeks was 
charged with domestic assault or domestic battery, an element of the crime. 
(1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 98, Ls. 3-11.) In rebuttal, the state responded to Beeks' 
closing argument: 
Ladies and gentlemen, there's a reason why I didn't go into any 
gory detail here. Okay. I don't get to. And I would have drawn an 
objection had I done so. So it's a little bit disingenuous to then 
argue that he wasn't charged with one of these crime, domestic 
assault or domestic battery. He had been. That's what was marked 
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on the no contact order. The reason we don't go into details is 
because I'm not allowed to. 
(1n/14 Supp. Tr., p. 103, L. 19 - p. 104, L. 3.) This comment was not error. 
The prosecutor was required to show that Beeks had been charged with 
domestic violence and here the prosecutor was responding to Beeks' argument 
that the state failed to present more evidence of Beeks' underlying domestic 
violence charge. 
Nor was the error clear. The second element of a claim of fundamental 
error is that the alleged error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Beeks cannot satisfy this element 
because he cannot show from the appellate record any error, much less error 
that is "clear or obvious." 
Nor has he demonstrated that the failure to object to the prosecutor's 
argument was anything but a tactical decision. Beeks claims that there could be 
no "strategic reason" for a defense attorney to fail to object. (Appellant's brief, p. 
19.) This is incorrect. Beeks' counsel argued that the state failed to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Beeks had been charged with domestic assault 
or domestic battery. (1/7/14 Supp. Tr., p. 97, L. 3 - p. 98, L. 11.) If Beeks' 
counsel had objected to the prosecutor's references in rebuttal or during voir 
dire, then the prosecutor could have responded by putting in more evidence of 
this underlying crime or by getting an instruction from the district court regarding 
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the limitations placed on the state regarding how much evidence he could 
present regarding Beeks' underlying crime. By not objecting, Beeks' trial counsel 
did not draw attention to or provide the state with a clear opportunity explore 
more fully Beeks' underlying charge. 
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Beeks to 
"demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Even if Beeks could overcome the 
first two prongs of the fundamental error analysis, he cannot show the error 
affected his substantial rights. The state introduced a video recording of contact 
between Beeks and Ms. Murillo. (State's Exhibit 1.) This video recording shows 
Beeks violating the no contact order. Any comments by the prosecutor did not 
affect Beeks substantial rights and did not affect the outcome of the trial. 
D. The Prosecutor's References To Multiple No Contact Orders Was Not 
Fundamental Error 
Beeks argues that the prosecutor made references to multiple no contact 
orders and these references constituted misconduct. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-
24.) Beeks did raise any objection, so these references need to be analyzed 
under the Perry fundamental error test. 
First, Beeks failed to show the prosecutor erred. Testimony from Ken 
Boals established there were two no contact orders. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 32, L. 12 - p. 
33, L. 5.) There was no objection to this testimony. (Id.) The prosecutor then 
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commented on this evidence during closing argument. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 104, L. 4 -
p. 105, L. 12.) As noted above the parties are entitled to wide latitude in making 
their arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be 
made therefrom. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at, 368-369, 313 P.3d at 24-25. On appeal 
Beeks does not cite to any law that prevents a prosecutor from commenting 
during closing, on evidence that was admitted during trial. 
Even if it was error, it was not clear error. It is not clear that jury 
understood that the prosecutor was referencing some unexplained non-
introduced no contact order. It was not until the post-trial briefing that the 
prosecutor clarified the testimony and his argument. (See R., pp. 56A-56L.) 
However, the jury would not have been privy to this post-trial briefing and instead 
it is likely the jury merely thought the prosecutor's references to "multiple" no 
contact orders were references to the multiple times the one no contact order 
was issued. (See State's Exs. 2, 3, and 4.) Beeks cites to the testimony of Ken 
Boals, an investigator with the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office: 
Q. BY MR. BOYD: With whom are the no contract - was the 
no contact order in effect? 
A. I noted there was two. There was one issued in February 
11th, that had a Ms. Murillo listed, Amanda, and there's also I 
believed several children listed on that no contact order. And then I 
noted another one that was in place June 24th of 2013 with just 
Amanda Murillo. 
Q. I'd like to ask the bailiff to hand you State's Exhibit 2. And 
I'm going to do 3 and 4 right afterwards, so. 
Can you tell me what you're looking at there or tell the jury. 
A. It's a no contact order listing Mr. Beeks and -
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Q. And who is it against? 
A. Amanda Murillo. 
(1/7/14 Tr., p. 32, L. 12 - p. 33, L. 5.) Beeks then cites to the prosecutor's 
closing arguments. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) In closing the prosecutor agued, in 
part: 
You're going to hear testimony or you did hear testimony, excuse 
me, from Officer Boals that there were multiple no contact order in 
place. Multiple. 
So ladies and gentlemen, this is a simple case. He knew about a 
no contact order. It was in place because of that domestic assault 
or domestic battery. 
(1/7/14 Supp. Tr. p. 93, Ls. 13-20.) In rebuttal the prosecutor again argued that 
Beeks knew about the no contact order. 
And you heard testimony that the no contact orders are put into 
effect for one year from the day's date. It wouldn't make any sense 
to say you're forbidden from having no contact - from having any 
contact with her, but I'm also going to end this order effective 
immediately. It doesn't make any sense. 
And so there was a typo. This wasn't the judge I think - well, 
maybe it was. I have no idea who filled it out. Could have been 
the judge or the clerk. They filled it out. The next day you can see, 
that's why we have the other things in here, showing that in fact the 
next day it was extended through 2015. Okay. And that's why you 
have this one, which is the amended one, one of the ones in effect. 
Okay. One of the ones. 
Again, I didn't want to be unreasonably cumulative and throw all of 
them at you. Instead you just go the one, okay, this one no contact 
order. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I have to interrupt here. The 
defendant is charged with violating a specific no contact order. It 
would be improper to speculate that there are other orders out 
there. The defendant is not charged with violating any other 
orders. 
22 
MR. BOYD: He's charged - okay. So he's charged with this one 
order. It's all here ladies and gentlemen. And you have before you 
the video where he talks about this very - these very no contact 
orders. He knows they exist. There's no - you can - the evidence 
that shows the he knows they exist is right before you. 
(1/7/14 Tr., p. 104, L. 4 - p. 105, L. 12.) 
None of these references were clear error. During the questioning of Ken 
Boals, the prosecutor asked when "the" no contact order was in effect. (1/7/14 
Tr., p. 32, L. 12 - p. 33, L. 5.) After Mr. Boals finished his answer, the 
prosecutor directed the questioning towards Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. Exhibit 2 was 
the original February 11, 2013 no contact order. Exhibit 4 was the amended no 
contact order that fixed the typo. Exhibit 3 was the June 13, 2013 extension of 
the no contact order. It is likely that the jury interpreted the "multiple" no contact 
orders to which Mr. Boals was referring were actually the multiple versions of the 
same no contact order that were introduced during the same testimony. 
This also a reasonable interpretation of the prosecutor's closing argument. 
The reference to "multiple" no contact orders comes at the same time the 
prosecutor is explaining the multiple times the no contact order was issued. 
(1/7/14 Tr., p. 104, L. 4-p. 105, L. 12.) Even if the prosecutor's comments were 
in error, it was not clear error and Beeks has failed to show the second 
fundamental error prong. 
Finally, the prosecutor's statements did not affect the outcome of the 
proceeding. First, the district court corrected any error by issuing a curative 
instruction during the prosecutor's closing argument. (1/7/14 Tr., p. 104, L. 25 -
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p. 105, L. 5.) Second, Beeks admitted to knowing about the no contact order 
during his recorded communication with the protected party, Ms. Murillo. (State's 
Ex. 1.) Since the violation of the no contact order was recorded, the prosecutor's 
comments did not change the outcome of the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment and 
conviction of Beeks. 
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